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Abstract
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
In the first part of the paper wereport estimated transfers
in the Social Security system for the RetirementHistory Survey sample.
We define transfers to be the difference between theexpected present
value of benefits less the present value oftaxes paid in, where the
latter is adjusted for the probability ofliving to reach retirement age.
Unlike previous researchers we, therefore, account forthe taxes paid by
people who died before retirement, and it turns Out thisadjustment is
important for some groups. The Retirement HistorySurvey cohort will
receive large transfers: roughly benefits will be aboutfour times taxes,
and the real internal rate of return will be abouteight percent. We study
how transfers vary by a comprehensivemeasure of wealth. People in the
highest wealth quartile have the largest absolutetransfers, and their
internal rate of return is as high as that ofany wealth quartile.
In the second part of the paper we study transfers forsix synthetic
cohorts, the heads of which are age 65 in the ten—year intervals 1970through
2020. Within each cohort 12 families are definedaccording to earnings levels.
We find that transfers are positive and large for the 1970cohort, and that
they decline steadily until they are negative for mostgroups in the 2020
cohort. Although high earners initially have thelargest transfers in the
1970 cohort, they have the largestnegative transfers inthe 2020 cohort.
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(516) 246—6176Introduction
Although Social Security retirement benefitsare often thought of
as a repayment of past contributions, it isnow becoming a matter of general
knowledge that the generation currently retired isreceiving far more in
retirement annuities than It contributed intaxes during their working lives
(see Boskin, et. al, 1983; Burkhauser andWarlIck, 1981; Leimer and Petri,
1981; Aaron, 1977). This is partly due to thestate of the Social Security
system: The retired generation is still, receivingsome of the windfall
start—up gains received by the elderly as such asystem is begun or enlarged.
These gains will abate as the system maturesand approaches a steady state.
The excess of benefits over taxes for thepresently retired is also due to
the generosity of Congress in theearly l970s: Between 1968 and 1974 benefits
were raised at a rate considerably higher than therate of inflation; therefore,
if the system had been actuarially fair inreal terms prior to 1968, it
certainly would not have been after 1974.
A natural question is what is themagnitude of the gains or transfers
(i.e., benefits less contributions in expectedpresent value terms) of the
elderly and how are they distributed? If the transfersare exceptionally
large or concentrated among the affluent, a reform of theSocial Security
system might logically include the present retiredgeneration giving up some
of their gains. It is likely that additional fundsor payout reductions will
be required In the next ten years and thatmajor adjustments are necessary to
operate the system over the next 75 years. The revenuesources or saving
could include an increase in payroll taxes forworkers, an advancement of the
12
retirement age, or a decrease in the benefits of some of the currently
retired. These measures to ensure the financial solvency of Social Security
will have intergenerational impacts. Raising the taxes of workers or
increasing the retirement age will reduce the rate of return of the present
working generation; cutting benefits, perhaps by making them taxable,will
lower the gains of today's elderly. Because a substantial fraction of the
elderly are far from wealthy, an across the board reduction in benefitsis
probably neither socially desirable nor politically feasible. However,the
wealthy retired could have their benefits reduced without causingundue
economic hardship. If they have received large windfall gains through the
Social Security system, fairness in restoring the financial soundness of
the program would dictate a reduction in their benefits.
In this paper we calculate the present value of lifetime contributions
to the Social Security system of a sample of the elderly, and the present
value of their expected benefits. The difference between the two we call
Social Security transfers. We also compute for each family in our sample
the internal rate of return to the retIrement program. That is, we
determine the discount rate which equates the present value of taxes to
the present value of benefits. Our data are the Social SecurityAdministration's
Retirement History Survey. It originally interviewed slightly over 11,000
households in 1969. The head—of—household was between 58 and 64 years of age
in 1969. These households were reinterviewed every two years through 1979.
In this paper we calculate Social Security transfers and internal ratesof
return for the sample in 1969, 1975, and 1979, but use the otherinterview
years to fill in missing values for our three yearsof primary interest.3
Our primary results are that Social Security transfersand rates
of return were very high for this population in1969 and remained high
throughout the decade. People in our sample couldexpect to receive three
to four times as much in benefits as they made incontributions, even using
a three percent real rate of time discount andcalculating death probabilities
using current life tables. Further, and more surprising,we find that the
wealthy received the largest transfers, and inmany cases they even had the
highest rates of return. One must conclude that the SocialSecurity system
as now constituted has a substantial transfer element, and much ofthe
transfer is from average workers to the wealthy retired.
We have attempted to calculate how the rates of return andtransfers
of the Social Security system will evolveas the system matures over the
next 40—50 years. We have done this by creating somesynthetic work and
retirement histories for six different age cohorts andexamining how the
Social Security program, as currently constituted, would treat them.
The households in this synthetic file are subject to the lifehazards
gIven by the 1969 life tables. We do not project changes in life
expectancies which may occur. We find that the transfer components
monotonicaily decrease with each succeeding cohort (spaced inage by
ten years) and that the median two earner household ofthe cohort now aged
thirty—eight will receive negative transfers. This simplyimplies, of course,
that they experience an internal rate of return lower thanthe three percent
real rate we used in calculating transfers.4
II. Methods and Data
The Retirement History Survey interview data has been merged with
the Social Security Administration's Earnings Record (through 1974). We
have extended the earnings history of each household by using the 1975,
1977, and 1979 interview responses. We then seek to calculate Social
Security transfers and internal rates of return for this cohort of households
as of 1969, 1975, and l979 However, we want to calculate the ex—ante rate
of return and transfers for the cohort with only the path of the Social
Security program taken as given. As far as we know, no one has pointed
out that calculations of transfers to the currently retired overstate transfers
to the cohorts of the retired, because the calculations do not take into
account taxes paid by members of the cohort who did not live to retirement
age. Thatis, the currently retired are the winners in the annuity gamble:
to study the intergenerational transfer component of Social Security, we need
to account for all the taxes and benefits of cohort members whether they are
alive or not at the time of the sample. As we shall see, for some groups
among the retired this is quite an important adjustment, substantiallylowering
our estimates of their rate of return from Social Security. Our method of
accounting for taxes paid and benefits received by deceased members of the cohort is
described in some detail in the Appendix, but it may be briefly summarized
here.
From sex— and race—specific life tables and actual Social Security
contribution data of married survivors, we estimate taxes paid by deceased
married members of each cohort. Some of these taxes are allocated to widows
to reflect the taxes paid on behalf of the widows by their deceasedhusbands.
The remainder are allocated to the surviving couples. Each single person's5
history is adjusted upward in a similarway to account for deceased
singles from the same cohort. Benefits receivedare treated in the same
manner. That is, benefits already received by deceasedmembers of this
cohort are attributed to the survivors. In thisway, we examine how an
entire cohort (in this case, alive in 1937 at thestart—up of the system)
has fared with Social Security. Theseadjustments treat the future and
the past symetrically: future benefitsare discounted, weighted by the
probabilities of living to collect the benefits, and thensummed to get
the discounted expected discountedpresent value; past benefits are
multiplied by the appropriate interest rates and bya multiple reflecting
•cohort size at the time benefits were collected. In1969, for example,
the taxes paid by the cohort and the benefitsreceived and to be received
by the cohort are assigned to the surviving members of thecohort.6
III. Results
The first of our results are shown in Tables 1—3, where we report
Social Security taxes paid and transfers received by race and marital
status for 1969, 1975, and 1979. The taxes are calculated according to
earnings records to the interview year, and the benefits under the assumption
that the person makes no more contributions to Social Security. Table 1
shows that the life table adjustment makes little difference for couples
in the sample. This Is because extra taxes are attributed to interviewed
couples according to the probability that both partners of an original couple
died before 1969, and this event has low probability. However, the taxes of
widows and widowers (referred to in this paper as widows only because they
predominate) are more than doubled. This occurs because the Social Security
Earnings History only records the widows' own earnings record and contribution
profile. When we attribute to widows the contributions made by their deceased
spouses, it naturallyraises substantially the total taxes assigned to widows.
Even so, all groups, including widows, have substantial transfers both in
absolute value and in the returnratIo, the ratio of the present value of
benefits to the present value of taxes. It is the case, however, that widows
have smaller transfers and lower return ratios than other groups: they only
receive the husband's benefit rather than the husband's and wife's benefit;
in most cases the taxes paid by the widow herself do not contribute to her
benefit because the husband's benefit is larger. It should be noted
that if account is not made of taxes paid by deceased husbands, one gets a
completely different impression of the return ratio of widows. For example,7
if average actual taxes andaverage benefits are used, the return ratio
is 4.9, higher than that ofcouples. If average adjusted taxes areused,
the return ratio is 2.03.
The internal rate of return is that interestrate, that will equate
the real life—table—weighted stream oftaxes to the real life table—weighted
stream of benefits, assuming future benefitswill be paid according to the
law in effect.. The median rate ofreturn of couples in 1969 was 8.39. This
is a real rate of return, and isvery much greater than what is generally assumed
to be offered by other investments. Forexample, In our present value
calculations for the first three columns ofthese tables, we have used a
three percent real rate; the SocialSecurity actuaries often use a 2.5 percent
real rate. Over a number ofyears the difference between such rates and our
calculated internal rate of return isenormous. For example, a 60 year—old
in 1969 would have been 28 in 1937, theyear in which Social Security taxes
were first paid. At a real rate of 2.5percent, a dollar contributed in
1937 would have grown to $2.20 in realterms by 1969; at a real rate of 8.39
percent, a dollar contributed in 1937 would havegrown to $13.17 in real terms
by 1969. At 6.01 percent, the widow's rate ofreturn, it would have grown to
$6.47. Over the 70 years that somepeople will be paying to or receiving from
the Social Security system, even smalldifferences in the rates of return will
produce large differences in the present values.
In interpreting the very high
internal rates we calculate, one should alsonote that Social Security contribu-
tions and benefits are very heavily shelteredfrom the personal income tax. The
benefits are completely tax free, the"compounding" is done on a tax free basis,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































In 1969 the rate of return of couples was thehighest of the
marital groups. Many researchers have stressed how thesystem discriminates
against two earner couples in the sense that the contributions ofthe wife
are wasted in that they do not increase the benefits of thefamily.
Certainly this is true relative to one earner couples. However, married
couples as a group obviously do at least as well as singles sincethey are
offered their choice at time of retirement betweenbeing treated as two
singles or calculating their benefits as a married couple. As agroup, the
married couples receive the highest rates of return from SocialSecurity.
Nonwhites have slightly lower rates of return than whites, and
significantly lower absolute transfers. These outcomes are determinedby
the higher mortality rates of nonwhites, meaning that fewer liveto collect
benefits. Our "fallen comrade" calculation of attributingtaxes of deceased
cohort members Is more important for nonwhites. Nonwhites also havelower
earnings records on average (reducing the size of the absolute transfer) and
a larger fraction of nonwhite couples have two earners which tends to reduce
the rates of return.
Tables 2 and 3 show Social Security taxes, transfers, andrates of
return for 1975 and 1979 by race and marital status. By 1975, taxes and
transfers of all groups had risen. The rate of return of whites had increased
even further, yet the rate of return of blacks had fallen slightly. The
difference is undoubtedly due to the difference in mortality:a higher fraction
of nonwhites than whites in our sample died before reaching retirementage
between 1969 and 1975. The difference between life table—adjusted taxes and
actual taxes of widows continues to be large, and it begins to widen for other




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































discussed later. It was still the case that couples had higher rates than
the other marital groups, and that whites had higher rates than nonwhites.
The life table adjustment has become important for all groups. The 1979
samples are those aged 68—74 years and these are certainly a sample of
winners in the annuity game.
Tables 4—6 present results on taxes and transfers by age in 1969,
1975, and 1979. In general, the internal rates of return and the absolute
transfers are higher for the older households in the sample in all three
interview years. This is presumably due to the maturing of the Social Security
system. The older members of this population enjoyed more of the start—up
gains of a pay—as—you—go retirement plan. The difference is most striking
in 1969. Recall our assumption that no future contributions are made to the
system. In 1969, the youngest cohort must wait four years to retire, so
discounting has a substantial effect.
Table 7 collects some of the rate of return-results from Tables 4—6.
It shows that the real internal rate of return to Social Security increased
from 1969 to 1975 for the younger cohorts In our sample, even when both taxes
and benefits are life table adjusted. The real return decreased for the oldest
two cohorts between 1969 and 1975 and also decreased for households of all
ages between 1975 and 1979. The net change was an increase in the rate of
return between 1969 and 1979 for the youngest two cohorts and a fairly sharp
decline for the oldest three. These differences are probably the result of
two factors: first, the law changes between 1969 and 1975 increased the
rates of return, but after 1975 the law changes only increased the future














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































effect on the real payments of retired people. Second, because delayed
retirement between ages 62 and 65 is roughly actuarially fair at a three
percent real interest rate, a delay in retirement will decrease the internal
rate from the high values shown here. Of course, the internal rate will
decrease even faster when someone works after the age of 65.
Tables 8-l0 show Social Security transfers, return ratios and
internal rates of return by wealth quartile and by age in 1969, 1975, and
1979. The wealth variable is quite comprehensive in that it includes the
value of home, business, and farm equity, other real property, stocks, bonds,
bank accounts, pensions, the capitalized value of welfare payments, and the
capitalized insurance value of Nedicare. It excludes Social Security wealth and
human capital. Table 8 indicates that Social Security transfers increase sharply
by wealth quartile, especially if taxes are adjusted by the life tables. We
feel such an adjustment is necessary to get a true picture of the way a cohort
has fared with Social Security. The median life table adjusted transfer to
those in the top wealth quartile is more than $6,000 higher than that to
those in the lowest wealth quartile, a 69 percent difference. The reason
that the increase with wealth is greater for the life table adjusted numbers
is that widows are heavily represented in the lower part of the wealth distri—
tion, and the fallen comrade tax adjustment is much greater for them than for
other groups. The increasing transfers with wealth are also due to the greater
contributions of the wealthy to Social Security, a system which offered this
generation a rate of return far greater than our three percent discount rate.
The importance of using life—adjusted taxes is also shown in the return ratios:
with unadjusted taxes, it appears that the lowest wealth quartile has a somewhat
higher ratio of benefits to taxes than the other quartiles, yet when account is










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, the rates of return shown in Table 8 are almost the same
for the wealth groups. Most researchers would find this result surprising
because the Social Security benef-it schedule has considerable progressivity.
Apparently, that is neutralized by the taxes paid by the deceased and, possibly,
by a different time pattern of contributions. For example, holding constant
total undiscounted nominal contributions, the rate of return will increase if
the contributions are made late in life rather than early.
Table 8 also shows how the transfers, return ratios, and rates of
return vary by age within quartiles. It is important to disaggregate by
age because both wealth arid the rate of return vary positively by age.
Table 8 shows that at each age the transfers to those in the wealthiest
quartile are much greater than the transfers to those in the lowest wealth
quartile. In fact, for a couple of age groups the transfers are almost
twice as great to the wealthy as to the poor. Table 8 shows that the
internal rates of return are fairly flat across wealth quartiles; the
highest rate of return recorded is for the upper wealth quartile among our
eldest cohort, the 64 year—olds.
Table 9 contains similar results for 1975. The wealth and transfer
figures are in 1974 dollars. The difference between adjustedand unadjusted
taxes has become more important as reflected in the differencebetween the
two transfer measures. Even more than in 1969, the unadjustedmedian return
ratio gives a substantially different impression than the adjustedmedian
return ratio: the one indicates that in percentage termsthe poorer elderly
gained more than the wealthy elderly, whereas the secondindicates they
did worse. The life table adjusted transfers to the wealthiest quartile
are roughly double the transfers to the poorest quartile at every age
except 70. Even their rates of return are higher at every age.25
The results for 1979 as shown in Table 10 are similar to the1975
results: the adjustment for taxes according to the life table isimportant,
and, in fact, removes the negative correlation of the median return ratio
with wealth quartile. The internal rates of returnar down somewhat from
1975, most particularly for those in the wealthiest quartile. Theapparent
explanation is that those who worked past age 65 lowered their rates ofreturn,
and that more of the relatively wealthy did that than those in thelower
wealth quartiles. The overall result of Tables 8—10, however, stillremains
that among the current elderly the wealthy have enjoyed thesame high rate of
return from Social Security as the poorer members of theirage cohort.26
IV.Simulations
In this section we calculate the projected transfers and rates of
return for six age cohorts, four household types, and three levelsof earnings
histories. This gives us some information about the intergenerational transfers
implied by the Social Security system and predicts how the intrageneratlonal
transfers will change for later cohorts. It also shows the effects of the
maturing of the system on the rate of return it offers.
The household types examined are single males, single females, and one
and two earner married couples. We have collected data on median annual
earnings for men and women by age from 1937 to 1977. These data wereextended
through the year 2020 with the assumption that median earnings grow at ten
percent from 1977 to 1982 and six percent thereafter. The accuracyof this
assumption is not critical to our analysis because we use it only to generate
the nominal earnings histories of our simulated households; that our profiles
exactly match median values is relativelr unimportant. We project two percent
productivity growth, and therefore four percent CPI inflation beyond1982.
For the simulated single men and women, we create three earnings prof liesfrom
age 20 to 65, or, for the older cohorts, from1937 until retirement at age 65.
The low earnings profile is set at one—half the median earnings pattern,while
the high earnings profile is set at the maximum earnings level subject to
Social Security payroll taxes or five times the median, which ever is less.
The one earner married couples are assigned earnings histories equivalent
to the single males, while the taxes of the two earner married couples arethe sum
of those of a low earning single male and female, a median earningmale and a
low earning woman and, finally, a high earning male and a median earning
woman. All told, there are 12 simulated households ineach age cohort; three27
earnings profiles for each of four household types. Theage cohorts are
people who reach age 65 in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2020.
Husbands and wives are assumed to be the sameage.
Unlike in the previous section, our simulations do not includewidows.
The single households have been life—long singles and theirtaxes reflect
their own contributions plus the contributions ofsingles who, according
to the life tables, die before age 65. The taxes of marriedsare also life
table adjusted, but only for married couples where bothspouses fail to reach
age 65. After retirement, assumed to take place at age 65, we keep track
of the joint survival probabilities of marriedcouples and credit the benefits
received during the resulting widowhood after the death of the firstspouse.
Table 11 shows the internal rates of return for the 12 simulated
households in six age cohorts. Several clarificationsare necessary before
these can be properly interpreted. First, these rates ofreturn are done in
an "ex ante" sense from age 65. By that, we mean that individualsassume
that the annuities they receive will remain constant in realterms (except
for reduced survivor benefits) and they do not take intoaccount changes
which may take effect ex post. Second, and similarly, the benefits andtaxes
paid out and collected after 1983 in our calculations are those projected in
the Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security Bulletin(1980).
Thus, these are not adjusted for changes which appear to benecessary to
balance aggregate Social Security retirement benefits and taxes.
The effect of the proposed changes will be to drive down the real rates of
return for the younger cohorts, almost certainly making them negative for




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reported in Table 11, then, should be taken as absolute upper bounds for
these households and age cohorts since all signs indicate that they will
pay more taxes and receive lower benefits than those officially projected
in the Social Security Bulletin and used in these calculations.
The internal rates of return calculated for the 1970 cohort are
consistent with our earlIer examination of the Retirement History Survey
population. Again, it should be emphasized that our simulated singles
do not include widows. Within each household type the high earnings household
has a lower rate of return. However, our earlier results indicated that this
did not imply that wealthier retired households had lower rates of return on
Social Security. The projected decline with cohort age in real internal
rates of return is monotonic and substantial. For example, the median single
female retiring in 1970 has an expected real rate of return of 9.1 percent.
If she reached age 65 in 2000, however, she would only enjoy an expected 3.8
percent return. Single women earn higher rates than single men, not only
due to their longer life expectancy but also due to their lower earnings profiles.
The results of Table 11 indicate that those reaching age 65 in 1970
and 1980 were among those receiving windfall gains from the start—up and
expansion of a pay—as—you—go Social Security scheme. The 1970 cohort enjoyed
higher rates partly because it had a shorter history of tax payments (this
generation was age 32 in 1937). The 1980 cohort and to a lesser extent the
1990 cohort did well because Social Security tax rates were low during a
substantial fraction of their work lives. Consistent with the results of the
previous section, we find that the start—up and expansion gains are diminishing,
but that they extend over a longer period than is commonly realized. Those











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































gains, and a noticeable fraction of theelderly population will be in
this category until theyear 2010.
The life table adjusted expected SocialSecurity transfers in 1980
dollars are shown in Table 12 forour simulated households. Again, the
results are roughly in accord withour examination of the Retirement History
Survey population. As in the previoussection, the real discount rate used
in the transfer calculationswas three percent. For the householdsretiring
in 1970, Social Security was "agood deal" and in most cases the higherearnings
households received larger transfers becausethey were allowed to participate
in this good deal to a larger extent.This effect offset the somewhat lower
internal rate earned by households withhigher earnings profiles as shown in
the previous table. For theyounger cohorts, the level of transfers is much
lower (and in some cases, negative)and their pattern across earnings profiles
is very different. Consider thehigher earnings households retiring in the
year 2010 or later; ratherthan being allowed to participate ina larger extent
in a good deal (which was thecase for the high earners earlier), those with
high earnings in the later cohorts are forcedto participate to a larger extent
in a program which offers thama poor return. Each of our high earnings
household types retiring in theyear 2010 has negative transfers. The
progressive nature of the program, which has hadessentially no impact on those
who have retired to date, isstrongly evident by the year 2010. The reforms
currently being discussed will not only further lower thetransfer numbers
of the young cohorts, butmay add to the strong progressive pattern
of the transfer figures alreadyprojected for them under current law.32
V. Conclusion
We have examined the real rates of return and the transfers in
the retirement (OASI) component of Social Security. Most of our analysis
uses the Retirement History Survey population which ranged in age from
58 to 64 in 1969 and which was interviewed six times from 1969 to 1979.
Our primary result is that this generation did extremely well on Social
Security, earning a real rate of return of roughly eight percent. We
calculated this number taking into account the taxes paid by the unfortunate
cohort members who did not live to retirement age, and found this to be an
important correction. Without it, we would get even higher rates of return
for the RHS household population.
We examined the rates of return and transfers by marital status, race
and age. The results were that the married couples had higher rates of
return than singles in the RHS population, and that non—whites did less well
than whites. The lowest rates of return were for widows when account is
taken of the taxes paid by the deceased spouses.
Perhaps our most interesting result, other than the high rate of
return itself, is that the rate of return does not decline with wealth for
this population sample. In fact, the wealthy in the RHS population have
earned roughly the same high rate of return as their poorer cohort members
and have enjoyed far higher absolute transfers.
In the final section of the paper we simulated the evolution of the
impact of the Social Security system on 12 household types. We projectthat
the high rates of return would have declined monotonically and significantly
even before the Social Security changes now contemplated. Thetransfer
components become negative for some households; for example,the negative33
transfer is projected at $180,000 (1980 $)forhigh income single males
currently age 27. The intergenerational transfers are extremely large
and the intragenerational distribution of transfers is quite different
(more progressive) for the currently young than it is for the presently
elderly.
The results of this paper should be useful in assessing how the
Social Security system could be revised. It indicates that the idea that
all current retirees should be protected from cuts and only those who will
retire in 20 or more years should be asked to rescue the system would lead
to a policy of protecting those who have done well at the expense of those
who are already projected to do poorly. Of course, this consideration must
be weighed against the financial flexibility of the young relative to the
currevtly elderly.34
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APPENDIX
CALCULATIONOF PRESENT VALUE OF TAXES ANDBENEFITS,
ANDRATEOF RETURN
Thebasic principle is that all taxes paid andbenefits received
by a cohort will be allocated to surviving members ofthe cohort. Unless
this is done the survivors willappear to have received above average rates
of return even under anactuarially fair annuity system. We distinguish
groups according to marital status (married, singleor widowed), sex and
race.
Consider first a single person ofage A with a stream of past taxes,
t., and of past benefits, b.,. Let P. be theprobability that a person will
live to age A given that he has reachedage i. Thus, for each person of
age A there were l/P persons living at age i. Therewere on average
t1(l/P —1)taxes paid at age I by people who died beforereaching age A
and who had similar tax histories to thesurviving person in the sample.
The present value of these taxes over allages less than A is
A
A-i ti(l/Pj —1)(1+ r.)
i=l 1
where.isthe price level adjustment.r1 was taken to be a Constant three
percent. This number was added to the present value of
taxes actually paid
to get the total of taxes paid by theperson in the sample and by similar
people who did not survive until age A. Because thesample is self—weighting,
aggregating over all singles will give a good estimate of totaltaxes paid
by the cohort, provided mortality rates areindependent of tax contributions.A- 2
The mortality probabilities are race and sex specific; they are calculated
from the 1969 life tables.
The present value of past benefits received by the cohort is
calculated in a way symmetric to the calculation of taxes.
Now consider a widow in the 1969 sample. The data only include her
tax contributions, which will be treated in the same way as the taxes of
a single person. However, in almost all cases her benefits are based on
the taxes of her deceased husband, and a rate of return calculation should
take those into account. This is done by allocating part of the taxes paid
by deceased husbands to the widows. The general reasoning is that for each
surviving couple, there were additional couples who paid taxes but did not
survive as couples. Some survived as widows, some as widowers, and some had
no survivors. From the life tables and our data on the tax histories of
husbands, we can calculate taxes paid by deceased husbands in the same way
as was done for singles. That amount multiplied by the probability that
the wife lived is allocated to widows; the remainder is allocated to surviving




—1).(1+ rj)A1 is the present value of taxes
i=1
paid by deceased husbands who were similar to the surviving husband. ET
multiplied by the probability the wife survives until the survey year is
allocated to widows and the remainder is allocated to married couples in
the sample. The allocation for widows is summed over all couples. That
amount divided by the number of widows is added to the life table—adjusted
taxes actually paid by each widow on her ownearningsrecord. In principle,
the taxes paid by deceased wives should be similarly allocated between theA- 3
couple and widowers, but for simplicity we allocated all of them to the
couples: wives have small tax contribution histories and the probability
that the husband outlives the wife is small. Again, it is assumed that
the mortality rates are independent of taxes. In addition,we assume
independence between mortality rates of husbands and wives. Past benefits
are treated symmetrically to taxes.
The present value of future benefits uses the 1969 life tables.
Mortality probabilities of husbands and wives are assumed to be independent.
The following provisions of the law were taken into consideration:actuarial
reduction for early retirement; one percent benefit increase for workpast
age 65; a wife may draw on her own record or her husband's record; a widow
may draw at age 60 at a reduced fraction of her husband's PIA, but at age
62 she can switch to her own record if it yields a higherbenefit; the PIA
calculation is based on the law in effect in the year of the calculation;
a widow's benefit is reduced if her former husband drew benefits before he
was 65 or if she draws benefits before she is 65.
The rate of return in year T is calculated in the followingway.
Let t. and b. be the life table—adjusted real stream of taxes and benefits 1 1
of an individual. The t. will be zero prior toyear of employment and
after retirement. The b. will be zero before retirement; afterT, they
will be calculated according to the Social Security law in effect inyear I.
N T
The rate of return in year T solves the equation b.(1 + r)T_i = tjl + r)T1, i=O 1 i=O
where N is the maximum age and 0 < T < N.